



Mission First: Strategies for the Inclusion of Mission-Based Decision Making in Resiliency Planning

Concurrent Technologies Corporation

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Introductions



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A Grocery Store Example





Outside an H-E-B grocery in Texas. (Photo: Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images)

Agenda

- Introduction to Mission Assurance
- Policy and Governance
- Technical Approaches and Tools
- Integrated Energy & Water Planning
- Bringing It All Together

Mission Assurance (MA) – what is it really?

DoD mission examples

- Missile defense
- Counterterrorism
- Civil affairs
- Reconnaissance
- Nuclear deterrence
- Undersea warfare
- Amphibious warfare
- Cyber warfare
- WMD Counter-proliferation
- Homeland defense

Defense critical missions are


“Global...designated by SECDEF as vital to national security...and critical to the execution of strategic priorities and plans”

- Does an installation have a mission?
- Does a facility have a mission?
- Does a facilities project really enhance mission assurance?
- Can missions succeed without resilient installations?

DoD Mission Assurance Construct

- **Defense Critical Asset (DCA)** – An asset of such extraordinary importance to operations in peace, crisis, or war that its incapacitation or destruction will have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of the DoD to fulfill its missions
- **Task Critical Asset (TCA)** – An asset of such extraordinary importance that its incapacitation or destruction will have a serious, debilitating effect on the ability of one or more DoD Components to execute the mission essential task it supports

Ref: DODD 3020.40



- **Supporting Infrastructure** - The critical path, interdependent components, and redundant capabilities that are used to directly support and assure the functioning or operation of a Critical Asset, such that the supporting infrastructure's loss, degradation, or denial will result in the failure to execute its associated task. -USMC MA Program


Incorporating MA Into Resiliency Planning

- Governance


- Energy-Mission Integration Group (EMIG)
- Energy Resilience Working Group
- DoN partnerships with States (CA, HI)

- Policy

- DoN Energy Security Framework
- MCICOM Installation Energy Security Policy
 - Mission Assurance
 - Continuity of Operations (COOP) plans
 - Mutual Aid / Mutual Assistance Agreements
- Third Party Financed Projects Guidance
- Installation Energy Security Plan (IESP) Guidance



Energy Security Planning Framework




- Leverages existing programs and data sources
 - Installation Development (a.k.a. Master) Plans
 - Real Property record database
 - Maintenance history and Utility outage reports
 - Energy and Water Consumption data
 - Mission Assurance Assessments
- Assess each installation's ability to sustain critical operations during a 14-day disruption

Tools to Meet the Operational Environment


- Operational environment increasingly network-centric and dependent on systems like energy and water that enable the mission
- Expand analyses to account the System of Systems (SoS) network
- Developing and refining tools that can be deployable to the local level

The System of Systems of a Mission




End-to-End Analyses

- Analyses should be a feedback loop that incorporates inputs and outputs at each stage
- Assessments first focus on mission owner requirements




Crown Jewels Analysis

- Mission owner-centric analysis through decomposition and joint stakeholder workshops
- Examines how Denial of Service might impact key objectives
- Break down assumptions of dependencies, criticalities, workarounds, priorities
- Allows for more targeted analysis and planning



Grid Modeling and Resilience Analysis

- Analyze current posture of assets deemed key to mission operations
- Leverage data being gathered
 - One line diagrams
 - Load/usage data
 - Priorities
- Translate data into modeling capabilities and analysis
- Look at resilience as multi-faceted



Challenges and Opportunities

- Turning data into information
- Establishing analysis parameters is essential but very challenging
- Executed locally but must have a global viewpoint
- Once everything becomes critical, nothing is critical
- Forces joint conversations that rarely occur in day-to-day operations

Condition Key: Blue = Nominal Green = Work-Around Yellow = Degraded Red = Failed						
	Mission Objective 1	Mission Objective 2	Mission Objective 3	Mission Objective 4	Mission Objective 5	Mission Objective 6
Asset 1	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Asset 2	Red	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Red
Asset 3	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Asset 4	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Asset 5	Red	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Yellow
Asset 6	Red	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Red
Asset 7	Red	Yellow	Red	Red	Red	Red
Asset 8	Red	Yellow	Red	Red	Yellow	Red
Asset 9	Red	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Red
Asset 10	Red	Yellow	Red	Red	Yellow	Yellow
Asset 11	Red	Yellow	Red	Red	Yellow	Yellow
Asset 12	Red	Yellow	Red	Red	Yellow	Blue
Asset 13	Red	Yellow	Red	Red	Yellow	Blue
Asset 14	Red	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Blue
Asset 15	Red	Red	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Blue
Asset 16	Red	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Blue
Asset 17	Red	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Blue
Asset 18	Yellow	Yellow	Red	Red	Blue	Blue
Asset 19	Yellow	Red	Red	Green	Blue	Blue
Asset 20	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Green	Blue	Blue
Asset 21	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Green	Green	Blue
Asset 22	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Blue
Asset 23	Yellow	Red	Red	Red	Green	Blue
Asset 24	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Green	Green	Blue
Asset 25	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue
Asset 26	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue

Integrated Energy and Water Planning

- Energy and Water Security Directive
- Installation Energy and Water Plan Guidance



	Risk Reduction Contribution (Based on Number of Critical Facilities Served)					Cost to Implement	Oper. Efficiency	E&W Demand Redn.	Funding Sources	O&M Impact	Feasi- bility	Priority		
	Critical Mission Sustain- ment	Critical Mission Risk Reduction	Installation Risk Reduction	1	2							3		
Generators and Plans														
1	Update and Maintain Generator List	No	83	No	LC/NC							1		
2	Generator Refueling and Service Restoration Plans	42	83	Yes	\$\$							1		
3	Tactical Power Systems, Personnel, and Support Equipment	42	83	Yes	\$							1		
4	Augment Mobile Power Capability	17	33	No	\$							1		
5	Utility Planning and Coordination	No	All	Yes	LC/NC							1		
6	Cyber Security	No	Yes	Yes	\$							1		
7	Readiness Testing	No	Yes	Yes	\$							1		
8	Emergency Planning	No	Yes	Yes	\$							1		
9	Curtailment & Water Stations Plan	55	128	Yes	\$							1		
10	Generator Replacement with Dual-Fuel Units	15	27	No	\$								2	
Demand Reduction														
1	Building Controls Optimization	89	No	No	\$							1		
2	Water Conservation	Yes	No	Yes	\$							1		
3	Energy Conservation	Yes	No	No	\$-\$							1		
4	Meter Critical Facilities	No	No	Yes	\$-\$							1		

Integrating Technical Inputs and Human Opinion...aka Planning

- New paradigm: Prioritize investment based on Risk Reduction
- Assess and Measure Risk with...
 - Unclear definition of “mission risk” associated with energy and water disruption
 - Constrained resources
 - Limited data
 - Conflicting opinions
 - Multiple possible operating conditions
 - Varying levels of technical expertise



Defining the Critical Requirements

“Must Haves”

- Critical Mission List
- How long to does the mission need to be operational?
- Energy and Water demand of these facilities
- Existing Backup
 - Including refueling and emergency response
- Condition of infrastructure supporting these facilities

Challenges

- Garrison perspective may not be the same as HQ; everyone thinks their mission is “critical”
- Individual mission owners don’t know energy and water demands (no basis for this decision)
- No individual facility meter data
- Poorly maintained generator lists
- Privatized utilities and/or poorly maintained infrastructure maps

Conducting Risk Assessment

“Must Haves”


- Identify unacceptable risks and ensure this risk is reduced
- Document vulnerabilities and deficiencies
- Identify Courses of Action
- Prioritize Courses of Action

Challenges

- Classified data
- Approved Critical Facilities List
- Cooperation of Mission Owners
- Poorly maintained generator lists
- Privatized utilities
- Poorly maintained infrastructure maps
- Conflicting priorities
- Master Plan projects and priorities
- Utility planning

Bringing it Together

- You are only as resilient as your most vulnerable node
- Requires a comprehensive view of local and global priorities
- Develop multi-functional tools that can define requirements and measure performance
- Resilience requires forward looking planning but most current tools and metrics force us to look retrospectively
- Expanded stakeholder engagement is key to understanding future requirements



Changing Paradigms

- Traditional facilities planning processes are not centered around missions
- Current funding environment requires mission-focused decision-making
- How can CTC help?
 - Translate high level policy and guidance into practical applications
 - Detailed analysis of requirements
 - Evaluate alternative financing options
 - Facilitate stakeholder engagement
 - Compare cross-service / agency perspectives
 - Develop policy and procedures for implementation



Questions